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Guidance Documents and
Regulatory Beneficiaries
By NinaA. Mendelson1

The World of Guidance
Documents
Federal agencies rely heavily on guidance documents, and their volume is
massive. The Environmental Protection
Agency and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration recently
catalogued over 2000 and 1600 such
documents, respectively, issued between
1996 and 1999. These documents can
range from routine matters, such as how
employees should maintain correspondence files, to broad policies on program
standards, implementation, and enforcement. Documents in the latter category
include Education Department policies
on Title IX implementation, Environmental Protection Agency policies on
hazardous waste cleanup, the Food and
Drug Administration's policies on food
safety and broadcast advertising of pharmaceuticals, and many more.Although
these documents often resemble informal
rules, agencies generally avoid Administrative Procedure Act notice-and-comment
requirements because guidance documents arguably qualify under the
statutory exceptions for general policy
statements, interpretative rules, or both.
These policies now typically are
express in disclaiming any binding effect
upon regulated entities or upon the
agency itself, a response to some recent
judicial decisions requiring notice-andcomment rulemaking for a guidance
accorded binding effect, as well as to
congressional concern about uncertainty.
Nonetheless, a guidance document often
evokes a significant change in behavior
by those the agency regulates.And if the
document includes an interpretation of
law, that interpretation may also receive
limited Mead I Skidmore deference in court.
Finally, despite the lack of formal legal
1 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. This essay is adapted from Regulatory
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policy Making,
92 Cornell L. Rev._ (forthcoming, 2007).

Administrative and Regulatory Law News

binding effect, agencies are increasingly
stating they will usually conform to
positions taken in guidance documents.
Consequently, a number of commentators have called for procedural reform of
agency issuance of guidance documents.
Over the years, the Administrative
Conference has issued multiple recommendations, including calling generally
for greater participation and for noticeand-comment for guidance documents
with a "substantial impact." Other commentators, however, have guardedly
defended the current state of affairs
because of a desire not to deter the
creation of guidance documents, which
help agencies supervise low-level
employees and supply valuable information to regulated entities regarding
how an agency will implement a
program. Moreover, they argue that a
regulated entity at least retains a formal
opportunity to challenge the agency's
policy at the time an enforcement
action is brought.

The Interests of Regulatory
Beneficiaries
Thus far, however, the debate has
largely ignored the distinct and substantial interests of those who might
(inelegantly) be called indirect regulatory
beneficiaries.These are people whose
behavior is not directly regulated or
who receive no government subsidy
or payment, but nonetheless reasonably
expect to benefit from government
regulation of others - pharmaceutical
consumers, women seeking opportunities in college athletics, environmental
users, workers seeking safe workplaces, to
name a few. Regulatory beneficiaries
may have been specifically named in a
statute or it may simply have been widely
understood that the statute was meant to
regulate one segment of the public to
indirectly benefit another group. These
latter groups have obvious and substantial
interest in the way an administrative
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agency "fills in the blanks" of such a
regulatory program.
Regulatory beneficiaries do sometimes benefit from agency guidance
documents, if the guidance happens to
be favorable in substance. Such a guidance can prompt useful changes in the
behavior of regulated entities. Guidance
document policies can certainly be unfavorable, however. For example, the FDA's
1999 guidance document advising that
pharmaceutical companies may advertise
prescription drugs to consumers without
supplying detailed risk information
prompted a significant and highly
controversial increase in television advertising.The Education Department's 2005
"Dear Colleague letter" to universities
suggesting that on-line surveys of
students could be sufficient to document
insufficient interest by the "underrepresented sex" in a varsity athletic team has
also been controversial.
Generally, regulatory beneficiaries
suffer distinct procedural losses when an
agency issues policy in this way, inhibiting their ability to hold the agency
accountable for its policy decisions.
Regulatory beneficiaries lose access both
to judicial review and to the process of
agency decision making. First, with
respect to judicial review, even if the
regulatory beneficiary has standing, a
guidance document may not be considered final agency action or ripe for
review at the time it is issued, especially
if the document expressly disclaims a
binding effect.This obstacle, of course,
plagues both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries.At least in theory,
however, regulated entities can choose
not to follow the guidance, wait for
agency enforcement, and obtain judicial
review of the agency's policy or statutory
interpretation at that time. Unlike regulated beneficiaries, however, regulatory
beneficiaries generally lack any such later
opportunity to obtain judicial review. In
many cases, the aspect of the policy of
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concern to a regulatory beneficiary \\ill
be realized through agency inaction. For
example, in the food safety conte:-.."t, a
Food and Drug Administration guidance
saying that it \\ill consider ready-to-eat
food "adulterated" under the Federal,
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act if the food
contains foreign objects oflarger than 7
millimeters in maximum dimension \\ill
mean that the FDA is unlikely to bring
an enforcement action against, saY. a
manufacturer selling baked beans or
pickles with 5 millimeter foreign objects.
Needless to say, challenging a decision
not to file a particular enforcement
action is \'ery difficult. Meanwhile, a
choice by a regulated entity to comply
with a guidance - such as by sifting out
sharp 7-millimeter long objects - will
also foreclose enforcement actions and
with that the prospect ofjudicial oversight. E \'en if there is enforcement
litigation, a regulatory beneficiary \\ill
have a difficult time interYening for the
purpose of arguing that the underlying
policy should be more stringent, since a
court generally \\ill be able to resolw a
particular enforcement action \Yithout
reaching such arguments.
Second, when an agency issues a
policy in a guidance document, regulatory beneficiaries are likely to ha\·e
significantly less access to the agency
decision making process.Assuming the
guidance document qualifies for the APA
exceptions to notice-and-comment
rulemaking. the agency has no obligation
to seek outside vie\vs, disclose data, or
respond to comments. Some agencies
indeed seek no public input at all on
guidance documents. Especially \\"hen
the guidance document announces a
significant policy, hmvewr. an agency
may well seek outside comment. The
agency may hope to gather new information, identify significant feasibility
problems. or flush out any political
controversy eark to minimize later executive or legislative oversight. Indeed,
agencies often claim greater legitimacy
for these policies as a consequence of
seeking public input.
A draft guidance might be posted on
the Internet or published in the Federal
Register for comment, but wry often,
agencies do not \\l.dely solicit comment.
Instead, agency employees make ad hoc
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decisions regarding public outreach and
to \\'horn to "float" a guidance document.
When this happens, regulatory beneficiaries can lose valuable opportunities to
participate.Agency employees often try
to include those \Yho are frequent
communicators \\·ith the agency. One
agency reportedly uses as its starting
point for public outreach lists of organizations that haw commented on past
rulemaking, or lists of contacts developed
through agency meetings on other
topics.Again, hmwwr, this process is
often highly arbitrary.Among regulated
entities, for example, a recent study of
industry involwment in FDA guidance
document development found that some
industry representatives telt closed out of
the process, finding it" opaque," while
others found access to FDA staff to be
easy, and the staff to be ··very responsiw.'" 2
Turning to regulatory beneficiaries.
agency participation decisions sometimes
overtly advantage regulated entities. For
example, the Federal A\l.ation Administration has e:-..-plicitly adopted an
exclusionary approach in its development of"ad\l.sory circulars," a major
category of its guidance documents
concerning a\l.ation safety The FAA has
posted on the Internet an exclusi\"e list of
17 associations, nearly all associations of
regulated entities and related businesses.
from \\·hich it welcomes comments on
draft ad\l.sory circulars.The FAA"s
posting e:-..-plains, "[W]e generally accept
comments only from recognized industry organizations. If you \YOuld like to
comment on a Draft Ad\l.sory Circular.
please submit your comments to one of
the organizations listed below, as appropriate."·' The list includes no airplane
passenger or consumer safety organizations. EPA's poliC\· on circulating its small
entity eml.ronmental regulatory compliance guides is to focus the circulation on
small business representatiYes. Finall:~ the
FDA has recently committed to seek
public input in adYance of issuing espe2
See Erica Seiguer & John Smith. Perception
and Process at the Food and Drug .'\.dminisrration: Obligations and Trade-OffS in Rules and
Guidances. 60 Food & Drug LJ. 17. 30 (2(103).
' See ··HO\Y do I comment on a Draft AdYisorY
Circular:·· posted at \Y\\"\Y.faa.gO\·/arp/
publications/ acs/ drafi:acs. cfin +:Ocommem
(Last Yisited Aug. 11, 2(1113).
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cially important guidance documents,
except where those documents are
presenting a "less burdensome policy that
is consistent ,,·ith public health.''"
\\'ithout suggesting any across-the-board
criticism of the FDA. one could imagine
that regulatory beneficiaries might sometimes ha,·e a comment on whether a less
burdensome FDA policy remains consistent \\l.th public health.
Finally. \\l.thout any conscious exclusivity whatsoever, agencies that consult
ad hoc on draft guidance documents
\\ill tend to deemphasize participation
by regulaton· beneficiaries. Because of
direct contact with regulated entities in
permitting. licensing. inspection, and
enforcement matters. an agency. as a rule,
\Yill know and have more regular relationships \\l.th regulated entity groups.
GiYen time and resource constraints
upon the agency. it is comparati\·ely
convenient and ine:-..-pensi,·e to reach out
to these same entities as a sounding board
for policy development. The agenC\· also
may haYe a greater interest in a good
long-term relationship \\l.th these entities, since it ''ill \\"ant to procure their
cooperation and compliance \\l.th the
statutory regime. By contrast, the statute
generally ,,l.11 not create any direct relationship bet\wen an agency and indirect
regulatory beneficiaries such as food
consumers, eml.ronmental users, or
workers in hazardous \\"Orkplaces.An
agenC\· official may ha,·e greater difficult\·
iden~l.ng the appropriate people to
contact and less interest in maintaining a
long term relationship. \ loreoYer. regulated entities. in particular. are likely to
haYe Yaluable intormation - often superior to that of the agency or ofregulatory
beneficiaries - regarding a new policy's
cost and teasibility. Finally. regulatory
beneficiaries are relativelv diffuse and
unorganized. compared \\l.th regulated
entities. and thus ''ill have te\Yer resources
and less ability to find out about a guidance before it is finalized or to obtain
executive or Congressional oversight. In
short. unless the agency itself chooses to
" See 62 Fed. Reg. :':%::-: (Feb. 2-;-. 199-1 \noting
that FD_-\ will seek public inpur aii:er issuance
of these 2l.lldances): f.3 Fed. Reg. -321. - .'2-+
(Feb. 1-+.c21)00) (confirming san~e position).
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give public notice of a draft guidance or
initiates contact with regulatory beneficiary groups, these groups are likely to
have less of an opportunity to participate
in guidance development.

The procedural costs imposed upon
regulatory beneficiaries as well as upon
regulated entities when agencies issue
policies in guidance documents clearly
call for greater regulation. Such regulation is unlikely to lead agencies to a
world of"secret law," as some comn1entators have speculated. Even with more
required procedures, agencies will have
significant incentives to go public with
their policies relating to compliance and
enforcement.These incentives will range
from a desire to provide regulated entities
with some certainty regarding a program's implementation (a desire likely to
be reinforced by members of Congress
interested in certainty and compliance
assistance) to a wish to avoid losing
enforcement actions because the agency
failed to provide "fair notice" of the
requirements it is enforcing, following
cases such as General Electric v. EPA, 53
E3d 1324, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Nonetheless, requiring notice-andcomment rulemaking for all guidance
documents, which would include
routine instructions to employees, is
clearly overkill. Nor does a proposal to
require guidance documents to have
"precedential effect" - and to require an
agency to give reasons for departing from
a guidance document's policy - help the
problems I am discussing here.While this
approach would clearly reduce uncertainty for those dealing with an agency,
it also implicitly presumes that the
guidance itself is valid and has properly
implemented the statute. It thus does
comparatively little for regulatory
beneficiaries, because it affords them
no opportunity to argue, say, that the
agency's choice is not adequately justified or that the agency should be more
aggressively interpreting the statute.
Instead, some other intermediate
solutions seem appropriate. Space and
time constraints will permit me to briefly
overview only three. One occasionally
discussed solution is to amend the APA
to require an agency to use notice-and-

comment rulemaking for "important"
interpretations or policy statements, or, in
the words of the Administrative Conference, those with "substantial impacts."
That would mean that a court could
invalidate such a guidance document for
failure to comply with the requirement.
Moreover, regulatory beneficiaries could
more fully engage an agency on a policy
before it is finalized, which could in turn
increase the information to the agency
about public policy preferences and
technical issues, and the final rule would
be subject to judicial review.The major
difficulty here is the burden on courts to
distinguish the "important" policies from
the others.Judges have typically shied away
from this sort of decision because it requires so much programmatic expertise.
Agencies could also make procedures
more inclusive as a matter of self-regulation. The FDA has done this to some
degree in its "Good Guidance Practices,''
and the Office of Management and
Budget has suggested it in its "Proposed
Bulletin for Good Guidance Practices,''
posted on the Internet for comment in
November, 2005. For a significant or
controversial policy decision, an agency
would give advance notice and collect
public comment. Neither policy requires
an agency to respond to comments,
however, and neither appears to subject
an agency's compliance with its policy to
judicial review.What is thus unclear from
these sorts of proposals is whether an
agency will meaningfully engage the
comments it gets. Comments from an
entity with the clout to mobilize political
oversight will, of course, receive attention, as such comments would in any
event.Well-intentioned civil servants will
undoubtedly try to read comments.
However, agency resources and time
would remain tight, and regulatory beneficiaries could invoke no new external
controls in the event agencies do not
fully consider their comments.
A third intermediate process-focused
option would be a new right to petition
to repeal or revise a guidance document
that did not undergo notice-andcomment rulemaking. No court has so
far construed the APA to afford such a
right.A citizen petition could give
substantive reasons for an agency to
repeal or revise such a document; in
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Possible Solutions

response the agency could modify the
guidance document or give reasons
why the document should remain
unchanged. (To avoid multiple successive petitions, an agency perhaps could
publish a notice inviting the filing of all
related petitions.) The agency's response
to the petition would be subject to judicial review.
Any citizen, including a regulatory
beneficiary, could thereby engage the
agency on a guidance document's substance. By requiring an agency to supply
crystallized reasons for its decision, this
process would likely make judicial review
more effective, and the inquiry on judicial review would be a familiar one: is the
agency's decision arbitrary or capricious?
Although it provides only a belated opportunity to engage the agency, it might
prompt agencies to use a more thorough
participatory process at the outset for
significant or controversial policies.
On the other hand, depending on how
many petitions are filed, the proposal does
have the potential to in1pose significant
costs on agencies.Those costs would surely
be lower than requiring notice-andcomment rulemaking across-the-board,
but it is unclear how the costs would compare to a more limited notice-and-comment
requirement for "important" rules.

Conclusion
The debate over agency guidance
documents has been incomplete because
of the failure to adequately consider the
interests of regulatory beneficiaries.When
an agency chooses to issue a policy in a
guidance document rather than a rule,
indirect regulatory beneficiaries in
particular can lose critical access to the
agency decision making process and to
judicial review.This is so even though the
agency may be implementing statutes
enacted in order to help those beneficiaries.While empirical research would
surely be useful in documenting the
extent of these costs, procedural reforms
that would confer greater procedural
rights on regulatory beneficiaries seems
clearly worth considering. Such reform
would also represent a significant step
toward ensuring the agency procedures
better recognize and incorporate the
legitimate, immediate interests of regulatory beneficiaries in agency policy. 0
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